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A B S T R A C T
This paper explores how distinctions between ‘intended’ and ‘side’ eﬀects are troubled in personal narratives of
taking psychotropic medications. Grounded in interviews with 29 participants diagnosed with mental illness in
Victoria, Australia between February and December 2014, we consider how people interpret pharmaceutical
compounds beyond their desired or intended eﬀects, and how such eﬀects shape and transform subjectivity and
their relationship with their bodies. This paper contributes to recent discussions of mental illness and medication
eﬀects, informed by feminist science studies. It emphasises the co-constitution of social, aﬀective and material
relations in the context of ‘taking’ psychotropic medication. This paper discusses three key themes as important
to the phenomenology of the nexus of illness and psychotropic medication: movement, ambivalence, and so-
ciality. Our analysis demonstrates how psychotropic drugs are productive of subjectivity through their promises
and potential, their unexpected harms and the institutions from which they are inseparable.
1. Introduction
Personal narratives about taking medication reveal the complex,
often ambiguous and social dimensions of pharmaceuticals. As tech-
nologies with discrete (intended) actions and eﬀects, psychotropic
medications, those that target health conditions attracting psychiatric
diagnoses, act on bodies and subjectivities (Duﬀ, 2014; Schlosser and
Hoﬀer, 2012). Medications animate organs and subjectivities in mul-
tifaceted, unexpected and ambivalent ways as they circulate inside and
outside the body. These circulations intersect with other social, aﬀec-
tive and material forces as they act on individual bodies, resonating
with some, interfering with others, as they enmesh the body in relations
of class, gender, power and race (Duﬀ, 2014; Fraser et al., 2014;
Roberts, 2014; Blackman, 2012). Varying according to these relations,
the eﬀects of psychotropic medications diﬀer considerably between
persons (Goldberg and Ernst, 2012), and while they can potentially
minimise symptoms associated with mental illness, they are known to
cause bodily changes such as temperature ﬂuctuations, weight gain and
blurred vision (Keltner and Folks, 2005). Psychotropic medications are
a class of pharmaceuticals intended to act on individuals' mood, per-
ception and behaviour, inevitably shaping subjective experience in
ways that invite greater scrutiny into their impacts on subjectivity and
embodiment (Fraser et al., 2014; Duﬀ, 2013). These medications act on
the central nervous system to ‘balance’ the brain's neurochemistry,
producing eﬀects that shape how they have become known, for ex-
ample as mood stabilisers, tranquilisers or antipsychotics (Keltner and
Folks, 2005). Whilst often less emphasised within the scholarly litera-
ture and certainly in clinical contexts (e.g. Goldberg and Ernst, 2012;
Keltner and Folks, 2005), these medications have an equally marked,
but also socially and materially varied, eﬀect on identity and subjective
experience, often transforming individuals' agency, relations, mood,
habits and temperament (Moncrieﬀ, 2009).
Instead of approaching indicated eﬀects or unintended side eﬀects
of psychotropic medications as separate phenomena, this paper ex-
plores how such distinctions are troubled. Grounded in original em-
pirical research conducted in Victoria, Australia, we consider how
people interpret and understand the actions of pharmaceutical com-
pounds beyond their intended eﬀects, and how such eﬀects shape and
transform participants' subjectivity and their relationship with their
bodies. This paper contributes to recent discussions of mental illness,
treatment and medication eﬀects informed by feminist sciences studies,
particularly the work of Karen Barad (2007), to demonstrate the
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complex ‘intra-actions’ by which treatment eﬀects, subjectivities and
embodied experience are co-constituted in complex social, aﬀective and
material relations. We take Barad's work, and feminist science studies
more broadly, as a means of troubling the relationships between med-
ication, subjectivity and embodiment. Our goal is to expose the gen-
dered and embodied intra-actions by which drugs and drug eﬀects are
co-constituted in human and nonhuman relations. Rather than treat
these eﬀects as stable and discrete, we aim to reveal the ways drugs and
bodies, in their intra-actions, are transformed while constituting new
subjectivities. Our analysis discusses three key themes: movement, am-
bivalence, and sociality in disclosing some of the key intra-actions by
which this co-constitution transpires. Analysis of these key themes will
help to reframe discussion of the subjective eﬀects of medication in
terms of complex entanglements. We follow Barad's (2007, p. ix) con-
ceptualisation of entanglement as more than ‘to be intertwined with
another’, instead considering how ‘individuals emerge through and as
part of their entangled intra-relating’ (see Fitzgerald and Callard,
2016). We unpack the entanglements of aﬀects, subjectivity and matter,
rather than the more common focus on objective measures of treatment
eﬃcacy predominantly found in biomedical literature (Angell and
Bolden, 2015). We close by brieﬂy considering the implications of this
reframing for ongoing discussions of the governance of conditions at-
tracting psychiatric diagnoses, and the experience of this governance.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. ‘Disease-centred’ logics, ontological instability and the production of
‘adverse eﬀects’
Our research interests are set within the context of ongoing clinical
discussions of psychotropic medication and their side eﬀects that have
focused almost exclusively on rates of compliance (e.g. Lambert et al.,
2004), how to measure side eﬀects (e.g. Waddell and Taylor, 2008), or
that locate side eﬀects as occurring in speciﬁc parts of the body, for
example, weight (Zimmermann et al., 2003) and hormones (Bou Khalil
and Richa, 2011). Such approaches to side eﬀects have been termed the
‘disease-centred’ model of psychotropic drugs (Moncrieﬀ, 2013, 2009)
that necessarily (and, we will posit, somewhat erroneously) separates
therapeutic eﬀects from side eﬀects, and treats symptomatologies of
mental illness, therapeutic and side eﬀects as discrete events. This ap-
proach inevitably installs ontological distinctions between disease and
treatment eﬀects, and between bodies marked by prevailing categories
of social diﬀerence; assumptions worthy of considerable scrutiny which
feminist science studies, and Barad's work more directly, so ably avails.
In contrast, a disease-centred approach presumes that medication acts
on the biological or neural underpinnings of mental illness. As a critical
alternative to these assumptions, Joanna Moncrieﬀ's work (2009, 2013)
repositions the mechanisms of psychotropic action as ‘drug-centred’ – a
model which encourages a more substantial engagement with the en-
semble of eﬀects that drugs can have. Through this lens, the actions of
psychotropic medications can be approached in a ‘much more am-
bivalent light’ and the eﬀects not ‘be parcelled oﬀ into therapeutic or
adverse eﬀects as if these were distinct’ (Moncrieﬀ, 2009, p. 18). This
insight will drive much of the analysis that follows, deployed through
Barad's discussion of ‘intra-action’ and the co-constitutions of drugs and
bodies in tangled relations of aﬀect and force.
Other scholars have also sought to problematise the disease-centred
model of psychotropic action by intervening in debates pertaining to
the eﬃcacy of drug treatments, the inﬂuence of ‘Big Pharma’ on the
ﬁeld of psychiatry, and the social and psychological harms of psycho-
tropic medication (e.g., Choudhury et al., 2015; Jenkins, 2011, 2015;
Pilgrim et al., 2011; Liebert and Gavey, 2009; Healy, 2004). Such work,
as well as broader scholarship within the social sciences, has increas-
ingly revealed the ontological instability of divisions between things;
between clinical category and personal accounts; between ‘abnormality’
and side eﬀects of achieving ‘normality’. For example, drawing on an
ethnography with people who have experienced psychiatric care and
psychotropic medication, several studies have unpacked the complex-
ities of decision-making, often highlighting the role of side eﬀects, ne-
gotiations and relations of power (e.g., Knight et al., 2018; Angell and
Bolden, 2015; Seale et al., 2007, 2006; Rogers et al., 1998). In addition,
concepts of phenomenology and embodiment have been harnessed to
shed light on the complex eﬀects of drugs (e.g., Morrison et al., 2015;
McCann and Clark, 2004; Parnas and Handest, 2003; Usher, 2001).
Usher (2001, p. 148), in a study on schizophrenia, for instance, ob-
serves that bodies lose their ‘taken-for-grantedness’ when people ex-
perience and learn to live with side eﬀects of medication, while
Morrison et al. (2015), in a study documenting side eﬀects of anti-
psychotics, note that although participants doubted the beneﬁts of their
prescribed drugs, they were resigned to enduring often-debilitating side
eﬀects. This work has highlighted the diﬃculties of assuming clear lines
between symptomatology, side eﬀects and illness experiences, and the
importance of phenomenological studies in revealing the resultant
complexities for decision-making related to drugs and health care. They
also point to the need for more holistic methodologies capable of cap-
turing the full range of medication and treatment eﬀects, particularly in
terms of interactions and interferences between these eﬀects (Duﬀ,
2013). Work in feminist science studies on the social, aﬀective and
material entanglements of bodies and technologies (Fraser et al., 2014;
Roberts, 2014; Vitellone, 2011; Barad, 2007; Waldby, 1999) oﬀers
some important insight into rethinking the eﬀects of drugs.
2.2. Entanglements, iatrogenesis and ‘revealing’ side eﬀects
Whilst the disease-centred approach to psychiatric care tends to
delineate between ‘things’, we argue that the eﬀects of and reactions to
medication always emerge within intricate material and aﬀective en-
tanglements. The term ‘iatrogenesis’ is often used to refer to ‘adverse
eﬀects’ experienced during medical intervention (Waldby, 1999).
However, this is not to suggest a simpliﬁed model of ‘harm’ whereby
distress can be ascribed to the drug alone or to psychiatric institutions.
As Catherine Waldby (1999, p. 79), writes ‘any biotechnical interven-
tion inscribes itself into a complex, dynamic of corporeal animation and
relationship, which redistributes its intended eﬀects according to its
own shifting logics’. Thus, iatrogenic eﬀects disrupt cause and eﬀect
narratives of drug functioning, and unsettle the epistemology of the
drug itself. As medication traverses through the body, it is broken down
and absorbed in blood and organs, becoming further entangled in one's
subjectivity. Researchers with personal experiences of mental distress
have emphasised the need for research on psychotropic medication to
investigate and acknowledge how ‘these substances … not only aﬀect
our bodies and minds – they enter our lives and shape our biographies’
(Russo, 2018, p. 16). In addition, such entanglements often do not
‘appear’ (in clinical conceptualisations of symptomatology, side eﬀects
and therapeutic eﬀectiveness) only as the medication is swallowed,
insofar as knowledge of drugs is always, already implicated in under-
standings of mental health and subjectivity that precede and give
meaning to this ingestion. Entangled in discourses and social practices,
medications are perhaps better conceived as assemblages of social, af-
fective and material forces that aﬀects bodies in complex ways, as they
aﬀect subjectivities (Duﬀ, 2014).
Such articulations of encounters with drugs, and the assemblages in
which these encounters are sustained, rely upon an understanding of
institutions, medication and individuals as mutually-constituted and en-
tangled; what Barad (2007) has termed ‘intra-action’. In contrast to
‘interaction’, intra-action recognises that agents (here: psychiatry,
psychiatric patients, drugs, institutions) do not precede their encounters
with each other; they ‘emerge through’ intra-action and are always co-
constituted (Barad, 2007, p. 33). Material objects, including psycho-
tropic medication, cannot be considered stable entities with speciﬁc
properties which act on independent body parts. They become parti-
cular things in relation to other things, forces and bodies (e.g., toxic,
J. Flore, et al. Social Science & Medicine 230 (2019) 66–73
67
therapeutic, enabling, side eﬀect producing and disease preventing).
Barad also considers that humans (and human actions) need to be ap-
proached in a similar manner. Therefore, how people are ‘prescribed’,
take and engage with psychotropic drugs require a re-evaluation that
considers the various entanglements of body, mind, discourse, institu-
tions and wider society that inevitably shape consumption events.
How might this type of approach be applied in this empirical con-
text? What are the intersections (and routine assemblages) of aﬀect,
bodies, expertise and pharmaceuticals, and what interests do these
service? Extending Barad's work, Elizabeth A. Wilson reconceptualises
depression as entanglements of moods and medications, describing the
work of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) as sets of ‘intra-
actions’. For Wilson (2011, p. 286), writing on the ‘side eﬀect’ of sui-
cidal ideation and SSRIs, this proposition suggests that ‘Suicidal idea-
tion is not an isolated, delimited cognitive event; it is the disequilibrium
of a neuro-pharmaco-ideo-aﬀect system given voice’. Barad, Wilson and
others (e.g., Roberts, 2014) provide a language for examining the en-
tanglements of psychotropic medication, mental illness and subjectivity
that will guide the empirical analysis to follow.
The three (entangled) thematic axes developed in this paper de-
monstrate how psychotropic drugs are productive of subjectivity through
their promises and potential, their unexpected harms and the institu-
tions from which they are inseparable. In developing these themes, we
are presented with a system of entanglements from which isolated side
eﬀects cannot be excavated. Our paper will demonstrate how the work
of pharmaceuticals (necessarily done in relation to other actors/ac-
tants) is inherently ambivalent and paradoxical, infused with con-
ﬂicting relations between recipients and diﬀuse eﬀects. Treatment in
the form of psychotropic medication and their eﬀects, produce complex
aﬃliations between subjective hopes for recovery, potential therapeutic
value and the possibility for disappointment or even harm, and the
alleged promises of the drug (Rose, 2007).
3. The study
This paper focuses on the narratives of 29 people diagnosed with a
mental illness in the Australian mental healthcare system (this study is
described further in Knight et al., 2018). Participants were recruited
between February and December 2014, via advertising through mental
health community support services, newsletters and online. Advertise-
ments brieﬂy detailed the aims of the study and researchers' contact
details. This open form of recruitment provided the widest possible
reach in the community. Following contact via email or telephone,
prospective participants were provided a ‘plain language’ statement
explaining the study in detail. Participants were advised to contact
researchers for further questions. Eighteen women and eleven men aged
between 22 and 65 years old were interviewed. Whilst most were
Australian-born, participants reported diverse ethnic backgrounds in-
cluding Aboriginal Australian, Punjabi Indian, Greek/Egyptian, Mal-
tese, Italian, Australian-Brazilian, Portuguese, British and Irish. Parti-
cipants' psychiatric diagnoses were self-reported, most had received
more than one diagnosis during their encounters with mental health
services, with psychosis, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and major
depression most frequently disclosed. Additionally, most participants
were on psychotropic medications at the time of the interview and re-
ported extensive histories of taking various drugs. Many participants
had experienced involuntary treatment (community treatment order or
involuntary hospitalisation).
On the day of the interview, the study was discussed with partici-
pants, and they provided informed, written consent. Participants were
advised they could stop the interview at any time and/or withdraw
consent to participate in the study. The second author was the lead
investigator on this interdisciplinary study and the fourth author was a
member of the project's advisory group. Ethics approval was granted by
the Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (CF 13/
2980–2013001607).
The interviews from which data for this article are drawn were
collected by inviting participants to ﬁrstly provide unstructured ac-
counts of their experiences of being diagnosed with mental illness.
Participants could begin their stories at any point in time, with some
choosing to start with ﬁrst clinical encounters of diagnosis, and others
earlier in childhood, thus recollecting early experiences of symptoms
associated with mental illness. Following this initial narrative, partici-
pants were asked to further clarify encounters with health profes-
sionals, instances of voluntary and involuntary hospitalisation, re-
lationships with friends and family, experiences of treatment
(pharmaceuticals or psychotherapies) and ideas on personal recovery.
This enabled us to identify congruities and divergences in how concepts
such as subjectivity, agency and illness appeared in diﬀerent contexts.
Interviews lasted between one to 3 h and were conducted in a place
comfortable for the participant. The interviews were audio or video
recorded and transcribed verbatim. Transcripts were returned to par-
ticipants to review and provide them with an opportunity to, upon
reﬂection, remove sections of the interview text if they wished.
4. Analysis
Transcripts were analysed in a series of iterative steps. Initially, they
were read closely by the two ﬁrst authors and discussed broadly in the
light of existing literature. We used participants transcripts both ‘as a
rich source of qualitative data’ and to observe how individual stories
moved in and out of the trajectory of collective narrations (Stone and
Kokanović, 2016, p. 101). This approach directed our attention to
‘nodes of interest’ that warranted further critical attention and could
alert us to concealed meanings (see Davidsen, 2013). Emergent themes
were noted, following by generating overarching themes and selection
of illustrative quotes to create a ﬁrst draft of the paper. Other authors
joined the writing process, contributing to structure, reﬁning the ana-
lysis and the identiﬁcation of additional relevant literature. Subse-
quently, further drafts were created collaboratively. The theoretical
framework of feminist science studies enabled us to conduct data
analysis and writing processes as emerging, entangled phenomena.
Attending to how data is read and ‘emerges’ through authors' practices,
we approached our analysis as assemblages of subjective realities and
knowledge production (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012).
As noted, our analysis was informed by feminist sciences studies
(Fraser et al., 2014; Vitellone, 2011; Wilson, 2011; Waldby, 1999),
particularly the work of Karen Barad (2007), to demonstrate the com-
plex ‘intra-actions’ by which treatment eﬀects, subjectivities and em-
bodied experience are co-constituted in complex social, aﬀective and
material relations, with related attention to how discourses shaped
participants narratives (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012). Our analysis ex-
tends previous qualitative studies of experiences of taking psychotropic
drugs (e.g., Morrison et al., 2015) and contributes to debates rethinking
the action of drugs (Fraser et al., 2014; Trivelli, 2014; Wilson, 2011) by
considering the role of objects, actions and institutions in the con-
stitution of subjectivity. While we aimed for cultural diversity in the
participants, and people reporting diverse ethnic backgrounds were
interviewed, no participant departed from ‘Western’ ontologies re-
garding drugs.
This analysis and its theoretical framings point to the impossibility
of isolating unwanted side eﬀects from the totality of experience of
medication and their eﬀects situated in the context of people's lives. The
experience of consuming psychotropic medication inevitably entails
highly variable, complex and inter-dependent eﬀects and outcomes.
This complexity is manifest in participants' reports of movement, am-
bivalence and sociality, and the ways medications are generative of
subjective feelings of hope, value, change and fear. We commence with
a discussion of movement and its varied physical and subjective itera-
tions.
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4.1. Movement
4.1.1. Physical motion
One of the dominant distressing eﬀects of psychotropic medication
reported by participants pertained to alterations in the way their body
feels, looks and moves. A compelling example oﬀered by participants is
the profound disorientated movements known as akathisia. Akathisia
has been deﬁned as ‘subjective’ feelings of ‘inner restlessness and the
urge to move’ and ‘objective components’ such as ‘rocking while
standing or sitting, lifting feet as if marching on the spot’ (Miller and
Fleischhacker, 2000, p. 73). Van Putten (1975, p. 43) notes that aka-
thisia is an aﬀective state, a desire to move, not a ‘pattern of move-
ment’, and adds it is ‘mistaken’ to consider akathisia an ‘exacerbation of
the original mental illness’. However, we argue, in light of the accounts
detailed below, that such conceptualisations obscure the entanglements
of subjectivity, embodiment, aﬀect and medication, and render ‘mental
illness’ as an objective, neutral and ahistorical entity in deﬁance of the
lived embodiment of illness and treatment.
Eamon, a 35-year-old man diagnosed with schizoaﬀective disorder,
oﬀered an account of akathisia while on triﬂuoperazine: ‘I was running
to places … one day I ran so far … and I thought, where am I? You
know, I had to get home’. The eﬀects Eamon experienced caused him to
move incessantly, he described running and ‘[pacing] for a long time’.
Eamon's descriptions of drug eﬀects demonstrate the ‘intra-action’ of
medication, eﬀects, embodiment and subjectivity by revealing how
each is co-constituted in the experience of consumption. This ﬁnding is
in line with Barad (2007) concept of ‘intra-action’, which we found
useful in analysing how Eamon's corporeal experience of medication
was produced concurrently with changes in this experience. For Eamon,
drug eﬀects did not follow a simple linear arc in which consumption at
time ‘point a’ led predictably to eﬀects at time ‘point b’. Rather an intra-
action transpired by which the drug and its eﬀects were co-constituted
as Eamon's corporeal and subjective experiences were modiﬁed. His
aﬀective experience is marked as ‘compulsive’, deﬁned by an urge to
move, while he described his desire to be still as frustrated by the es-
tranged embodiment of perpetual motion. We would suggest that this
manifestation of akathisia signals the slippery qualities of symptoms of
mental illness where subjectivity, embodiment, medication and mental
illness are intra-actively produced. It is essential to think of the re-
lationship between psychotropic medication, the body and psychiatric
diagnoses as unsettled and inextricable. Beyond questions of continual
movements and their role in producing subjectivity, akathisia also
raises questions of how subjectivity can be approached as sets of con-
nections to objects, bodies and motion itself.
In contrast to continual movement, Nick, a 41-year-old man diag-
nosed with schizoaﬀective disorder described taking several typical
antipsychotics (see Moncrieﬀ, 2013) that made him ‘dystonic’: ‘It made
me not being able to move properly. I was not in a very good shape, and
I was having muscle spasms … my arms were stiﬀ. I was like an ironing
board.’ Nick also expressed frustration at the advice he received from
his psychiatrist, ‘he didn't change the medication. He wasn't looking at
me as a person. He was looking at me with symptoms of a mental ill-
ness'. We see an interesting diﬀerence in the interpretations of side
eﬀects between Nick and his psychiatrist. In Nick's account, the medi-
cation is bound up in a ‘dystonic’ embodiment which distresses him.
The eﬀects of medications here cannot be fully distinguished from the
therapeutic promises of the drugs. The psychotropic medication is seen
to animate material-discursive relations to drugs. The actions of drug,
subjectivity and institutional power relations manifest in the response
of Nick's psychiatrist who parcels oﬀ the ‘side’ eﬀects and thinks of
ways to minimise them, ignoring the embodied, material-discursive
entanglements of Nick's subjectivity with the drug. For Barad (2007, p.
91), ‘practices of knowing are speciﬁc material engagements that par-
ticipate in (re)conﬁguring the world’. Relations of power, such as be-
tween psychiatrist and patient, do not simply create positions of sub-
ordination and domination in the world. The materiality of
psychotropic drugs and their inextricability from institutions and in-
dividuals, inevitably reveals relations of power, sociality and aﬀect that
actively reconﬁgure how knowledge is produced.
4.1.2. Gendered cellular motion
All participants who were taking psychotropic medication reported
experiencing a range of eﬀects embodying the therapeutic regime,
many of which were referred to as debilitating. Medication fractured
the physiological order to which participants were accustomed, with
signiﬁcant ongoing impacts on subjectivity. For example, Alejandra, a
33-year-old woman with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, described how
risperidone caused changes to her body:
I wasn't menstruating … So that was quite upsetting … I started
lactating … I shouldn't be on medication that's making me lactate …
being forced to be on [risperidone] which you know causes lactation
… I think it was a bit cruel.
Interestingly, a 40-year-old male participant with a diagnosis of
bipolar aﬀective disorder I, Vincenzo, experienced shock when he
learned that he could begin to lactate. He could not recall the drug's
name, but this possibility disrupted his ideas of male embodiment:
one of them that really kind of freaked me out… was the fact that as
a male I could start lactating … I was like this … is going to like
damage me big time if that's something that's going to happen from
taking these tablets.
Another participant, Amrick, a 32-year-old man who was diagnosed
with paranoid schizophrenia, did not use the term ‘lactation’ but ex-
plained that one side eﬀect of taking quetiapine was an increase in his
prolactin levels and an enlarged breast area. Combined with impotence,
these corporeal shifts caused him signiﬁcant distress.
Feeling distress because of the absence of menstrual periods reveals
the troubling of gendered identities through new (and disruptive)
pharmaco-physical interactions, reﬂecting the entanglements of medi-
calisation, identity, and ‘normality’. Alejandra expects the manifestation
of menstrual periods. By the same token, her body lactating at a time
when it is neither expected nor ‘needed’, caused signiﬁcant concern
such that she demanded a change of medication. The cultivation and
disruption of gendered subjectivities are also clearly at work in
Alejandra, Vincenzo and Amrick's experiences. Beyond disturbing
gendered physiological form, gender is produced as problematic
through the (potential) encounter with breast milk and sexual dys-
function. It is thus not simply a question of drugs encountering gender,
but one of drugs and gender being mutually constituted as the medi-
cation encounters bodies, transforming subjectivities and disrupting
identities.
A mouth that drools, a breast suddenly lactating, a body part dis-
tended, tics in a section of one's visage, these complex eﬀects of psy-
chotropic medication transform embodied subjectivities, sometimes
quite abruptly. The overall eﬀects of drugs fragment and ‘re-assemble’
the body in diﬀerent ways. These changes, quite paradoxically, become
indicators of illness upon the body; they metaphorically bring the
symptoms to the surface. Therapeutic regimes, in their embodied eﬀects,
function to reveal (often previously concealed) features of the person
and aﬄiction. Or do they produce these very symtomatologies? It is
here that Barad (1998) work on the before, during and after come into
play; the symptoms follow the treatment, or does the treatment produce
the symptoms? These accounts challenge the linear progression of time
and therapy, that is, from emergence, treatment and recovery, to il-
lustrate the unsettling of temporal delineations between symptom, side
eﬀect and ‘normality’.
The implication is that various assumed ontological splits (person/
population, drugs/disease, recovery/health, illness/symptoms), slip
into murkier territory. The appearance of illness is thus more accurately
viewed as a co-production of this particular scene and the person, rather
than mere manifestation; it is induced emergence, mediated by
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pharmacological materials and respective expertise, rather than phy-
siological manifestation. ‘Individuals’, ‘symptoms’, ‘aﬄictions’, ‘re-
coveries’ become collective and relational productions (with agree-
ments and disagreements therein) rather than reﬂecting taken-for-
granted ideas about individual diseases (symptoms) and collective re-
sponses (therapies). Such distinctions become untenable, and in doing
and being so, raise questions about why one would assume such things
hold together at all. This speaks to the power of an individualised logic
in the collective imagination, and the need for ordering in the context of
disordered being in the world. Thus, it is not that symptoms follow
treatment or treatment produces symptoms, it is that there is no
meaningful, coherent line between these concepts. And that the attempt
to delineate is an act of power and in turn concealment of the perni-
cious eﬀects of pharmacological interventions (which can become
packaged with disease).
4.1.3. Resisting motion
For a few participants, the enmeshment of mental illness and dis-
tressing eﬀects of medications caused disruptions to subjectivity (and
life) to the extent that they decided to cease their medication. For in-
stance, Florence, a 37-year-old woman diagnosed with reactive psy-
chosis, noted that the experience of side eﬀects, which in her narrative
is enmeshed with the experience of mental illness, stood in stark con-
trast with what life in her thirties should be. As she said, ‘[this] is not
the life’. The combination of constant fatigue and weight gain seemed
to fragment Florence's understanding of who she is: ‘I was putting on
weight … it was still enough for me to feel out of touch with myself’.
Florence described her thoughts as ‘paranoid and conspiracy like’ but
maintained she never heard voices. After being given diazepam and
another medication which name she could not recall, Florence also
explained that she heard ‘an audio voice [she] never heard before in
[her] head saying two times, “Shut up, shut up”.’ Her symptoms were
exacerbated by the medication, and she was unsure whether she had
been given an additional drug. Her account reveals the ambiguous
qualities of drugs, and how drugs can become continuous in accounts of
mental illness. Florence's subjectivity as a person diagnosed with a
mental illness, and her own understanding of her condition, are further
transformed through contact with drugs.
4.2. Ambivalence
All participants taking psychotropic drugs expressed complex am-
bivalence when explaining the diversity of eﬀects they experienced.
This ambivalence pertained, on the one hand, to feelings that medica-
tion was eﬀective in alleviating certain symptoms even as it caused
distressing adverse eﬀects. On the other hand, ambivalence manifested
in expressions of doubt as to whether the drugs were working at all.
Participants who take drugs are necessarily shadowed by the im-
possibility of knowing what might have happened – to their health, to
their symptoms – if they had not taken medication. If additionally, there
is doubt over whether the medication works, there is also the diﬃculty
of determining whether the medication is inducing new symptoms, as
well as, or instead of, potentially exacerbating – rather than allying –
existing ones. Such epistemological uncertainty – both about how to
interpret the action of drugs, and how to judge one's own medicated life
in relation to an imagined life that might have not included drug-taking
– was prominent in several interviews. Indeed, while clinical discourses
of psychotropic medication identify the labour of drugs on speciﬁc
neurons and organs (Keltner and Folks, 2005), experiential narratives
reveal the impossibility of ﬁrmly locating the eﬀects of drugs, while
questioning what drugs are ‘supposed’ to do for the individual. For
Seamus, a 39-year-old man diagnosed with bipolar II and depression,
the eﬀects of the drugs were diﬃcult to speciﬁcally locate:
I've often wondered whether I've had any beneﬁt from medication
I've taken … there's no way that my psychiatrist is going to stop
prescribing me medication … at times I've felt better about being on
the medication … it hasn't stopped me from becoming unwell, ever
… is medication supposed to do that? I don't know.
Seamus' account reveals doubt about the eﬃcacy of medication, the
accuracy of diagnosis and the purpose of treatment. Similarly, Molly, a
47-year-old woman with several diagnoses over time including bor-
derline personality disorder, major depression and rapid-cycling bipolar
disorder, considered that while the ‘only thing [she gets] are side ef-
fects’, she continues her treatment because of her psychiatrist sug-
gesting she will ‘be worse’ without medication and her concern that she
would ‘be seen as non-compliant’.
In Molly's and Seamus' encounters with psychiatric diagnosis and
medication, subjectivity emerges in deep enmeshment with institutions,
psychiatrists, mental illness and the eﬀects of medications. Such en-
counters draw our attention to the entangled intra-active processes
through which subjectivities are produced. Take the subjective identity
of the ‘non-compliant’ patient that Molly is so concerned about; this
identity does not pre-exist the body to which it becomes attached, but
instead is co-constituted in its entanglements with health practitioners,
treatment guidelines, mental health policy, clinical settings and prac-
tices. Molly is prepared to tolerate ‘wanting to vomit every morning’ in
order to avoid this subjectivation, and her corresponding identiﬁcation
as a non-compliant subject, in ways that remind us of Barad's (1998, p.
106) argument that ‘“subjects” and “objects” do not pre-exist as such,
but are constituted within particular practices’. Molly, the ‘compliant
subject’, is one example.
Other participants' experiences were also marked by ambivalence,
representing the ‘multiple paradoxes of lived experience’ (Jenkins,
2015, p. 70). Diagnosed with major depression and bipolar II, 37-year-
old Keith noted: the medications ‘might have been stopping me from
hurting myself but … they weren't helping me really in terms of leading
a life and I was totally at the mercy of the side eﬀects.’ We return to the
question of what kind of life participants imagined for themselves
through medication in the following pages. For the time being, we
would like to suggest that more than a deep ambivalence to medication,
Keith's experience also reveals that the eﬀects of medications are not
symmetrical across bodies and lives. For Keith, medication eﬀects are
utterly entangled in complex relations between his subjective experi-
ence of desires for self-harm, hopes for a particular kind of life, and
frustrations at living at the ‘mercy’ of unpredictable eﬀects.
Psychotropic drugs can be experienced simultaneously as ‘saviours’
bringing quietude and impediments causing distress, indicating how
subjectivity is transformed through the ambivalences of experiencing
the asymmetrical and complex eﬀects of the pharmacological regimen.
As agents and voices of resistance and negotiation within the ﬁeld of
psychiatric knowledge, our participants considered trust and control
paramount to their treatment. Psychotropic medication became a sig-
niﬁer of both medical expertise and a loss of control. Medication be-
came symbolic of a system working to withdraw agency and improve
symptoms and quality of life. Larry, a 37-year-old man with multiple
diagnoses including schizoaﬀective disorder and obsessive compulsive
disorder, shared his thoughts on how he lives with the ambiguities of
his diagnoses and psychotropic medication:
it's got side eﬀects and that's unpleasant … You have to put up with
them. There's no other word for it. … unless some miracle cure
comes … this is going to be my life for the rest of my life … it's like
having an incurable disease. It can be managed it need'nt get in your
way all the time … But it's never going to quite leave your con-
sciousness. And I think you can run away from it every now and
then. But you just have to realise that you just have to take your
medication at 10–10:30 at night as usual.
Larry's evocative words – that psychiatric diagnoses never quite
disappear from one's consciousness – stand in stark contrast to dis-
courses of mental illness which rely on the ‘master clinical trope’
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(Jenkins, 2015, p. 38) of chemical imbalance. For Jenkins (2015, p. 39),
the language of chemical imbalance does not capture the complex
subjectivity at work through symptoms of mental illness and the in-
gesting of psychotropic medication. Subjectivity, in Larry's example, is
deeply enmeshed in diagnoses, and how drugs work and do not work,
entailing a ‘becoming-with the drugs’ (Trivelli, 2014, p. 159). The drug
does not merely materialise its eﬀects (therapeutic or otherwise) as it
dissolves and journeys through the body, nor does it remain a passive
object prior to swallowing. The psychotropic medication can be ap-
proached as already doing, involved in the task, in a network of humans
and objects. In our example, the doing of the psychotropic medication is
also invested with promises, hope and meaning. Thus, mental illness
never leaves individuals' ‘consciousness’ and is inseparable from med-
ication that needs to be taken ‘at 10–10:30 at night’ and its ensemble of
eﬀects. Instead, we can see how mind-bodies-drugs are mutually con-
stituted and inextricable from each other's entanglements.
4.2.1. Institutional power relations and the mutability of drugs
Ambivalence about medications and treatment for mental illness
mean that adverse eﬀects cannot be simply located in speciﬁc parts of
the body and documented as though they are separate from institu-
tional power relations. Alejandra, for example, spoke of the lack of trust
in her ability to take medication:
Rather than trusting that I would take the medication if I was given
the choice of oral… tablets but they thought that it was best to keep
me on the [risperidone] injections so that… I wouldn't lie… I found
they were just taking control out of … my life and I had no power in
the process.
This account of the transition from oral tablets to injections provides
insight into the ‘social life’ of drugs (Duﬀ, 2013) and the mutable
qualities of medications. In Alejandra's account, psychotropic medica-
tions are neither stable entities nor predictable objects. Not only can
their shape change, they are also in the process of transformation when in
contact with certain subjects. Instead of viewing the syringe as a ‘dead
device’, Vitellone (2011, p. 201) encourages us to view it as ‘fully alive
to the event at hand’ (see Fraser et al., 2004). By conceiving of objects
as enactments, Barad is able to unpack the agency of objects involved in
scientiﬁc experiments. For Barad (2007, p. 203), the material partici-
pation of scientists and their apparatuses is central to the production of
knowledge. Thus, if we consider the syringe as apparatus, it becomes
possible to view Alejandra's subjectivity as entangled in the materiality
of the needle and the mixture held within. The encounter not only
withdraws power from Alejandra, as the ‘non-compliant’ subject is
enacted and entangled, her subjectivity is actively undone and remade
through those discourses as well as the syringe itself, which is loaded
with meaning and knowledge.
If the concept of ‘intra-action’ signiﬁes that the object studied
cannot be separated from the practice and knowledge that makes it
comprehensible to us, then psychotropic medication needs to be re-
imagined too and re-examined through its ensemble of eﬀects, the
discourses of hope attached to the drug, and the institutional power
relations that shade every encounter between bodies and medications.
In an interesting example of the mutability of objects described by
Barad (1998, 2007), 56-year-old Alexis diagnosed with schizophrenia,
considers medication as food: ‘I take an orange and it makes me feel
better and if I take … a tablet that makes me feel better, what's the
diﬀerence between an orange and the tablet?’ Referring to medication
as ‘mind food’ (Ecks, 2014), Alexis believes there should not be any
stigma attached to drugs. He also introduces pharmaceutical corpora-
tions to the complex relations of power entangled in drugs:
a lot of energy has been placed, a lot of research, a lot of … getting
chemicals together … to put that compound together in that tablet
form. A lot of energy has been put in developing that medication for
the wellness of the person … [this eﬀort] should be respected
Knowledge of the drug (whether cultural, clinical, experiential or
otherwise) is crucial to what makes it ‘work’; a drug becomes, rather
than is, and its subjects are co-producers of its eﬀects. One cannot de-
tach the drug from its dispersed eﬀects on bodies (organs, neurons,
blood and so on), how the eﬀects are known and narrated and by whom,
and the institutions and persons that make the ingestion of drugs pos-
sible (psychiatrists, hospitals and pharmaceutical corporations).
Beyond the object itself, and its complex entanglements in processes of
treatment, care and support, our analysis revealed key links between
the expressions of subjective identity in the consideration of medication
eﬀects, and the character and experience of sociality.
4.3. Sociality
Apart from their ensemble of eﬀects on the brain and other parts of
the body, a key aim of psychotropic medication is to facilitate the
subject's return to a functional, normative social life. In other words,
drugs are commonly said to help individuals become reacquainted to
‘normal’ sociality. This return to the social or functional involves na-
vigating competing economic, relational and intimate demands, such as
family and work. Qualitative and ethnographic studies with people
taking psychotropic medication have tended to render the pill as a
‘static’ object, even while acknowledging and unpacking its therapeutic
and adverse eﬀects (e.g., Morrison et al., 2015; Steﬀenak et al., 2015;
Carrick et al., 2004). This approach has not always been alert to the
social life of medications, and the ways their ingestion transforms the
networks in which drugs are embedded. The narratives of our partici-
pants not only demonstrate how psychotropic medications have a social
life, they also reveal a kind of pharmaco-aﬀective sociality. Such soci-
ality, deploying Barad's insights, does not distinguish between the sub-
ject that swallows the object and engages in social life. Instead, the
medication enacts as it participates in forms of pharmaco-aﬀective so-
ciality whereby the drug can ‘lubricate’ social contact and transform
subjectivity as an ‘always unﬁnished, interrupted, intricate and non-
linear’ project (Kokanović and Flore, 2017, p. 331).
In his discussion of the competing demands of his life, Amrick ex-
plained that one must prioritise medication, rather than ﬁnance or fa-
mily:
They'd just go … have this medication … your ﬁrst priority is in
your medication. There's other priorities, you know. If it's not ac-
commodation it's your ﬁnances, if it's not your ﬁnances you're
worried about your family … So until I got it through my head that
my medication is the most important thing to keep a … stable mind.
Amrick's comments evoke the need to ‘spend time’ on and with
medication. We can also see the entanglements of illness and medica-
tion as priorities demonstrating how understandings of mental illness
are further transformed through contact with drugs. The labour of
taking one's medication requires more than ‘responsibilised’ sub-
jectivity (Rose, 2007), it also requires attunement to pharmaco-aﬀective
sociality.
Scholars researching experiences of taking psychotropic medica-
tions have noted the role of optimism and the ‘future’ in people's nar-
ratives (Carrick et al., 2004). Our analysis however complicates the idea
that taking medication simply includes dimensions of hope (for re-
covery, for example). While we acknowledge that hope plays a key role,
we draw on Barad (2007) to suggest that concepts of futurity, drugs,
subjectivity, and sociality itself, are made and remade in their intra-
actions with each other, another reason why the theme of ambivalence
runs so strongly through our participant's accounts. Thus, the agency
that humans are often assumed to ‘possess’ when articulating ideas of
the future, ‘is an enactment, not something that someone or something has’
(Barad, 2007, p. 235). It therefore becomes possible to illuminate how
accounts of taking psychotropic medication participate in ‘making’
particular kinds of lives characterised by ambivalent experiences of
hope and fear, promise and stasis.
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Several participants spoke of hopes for their lives, and the role that
medication plays in this conﬁguration of hope as an aﬀective and ma-
terial orientation to an imagined future self. Wendy, for example, a 49-
year-old woman with multiple diagnoses including schizophrenia and
bipolar disorder spoke of her desire to ‘go oﬀ the meds’, even as she
acknowledged, ‘I've been oﬀ them for a period but they put me back on
so I must need them’. Meanwhile, Cheryl, a 40-year-old woman diag-
nosed with schizophrenia believed that the medication was ‘good en-
ough’ if it ‘gets rid of the experiences … of hearing someone talk’. Some
also referenced how medications might mediate relations to family and
friends in the future, depending on the material and social eﬀects of
these medications. Discussing her medication, Joan, a 36-year-old
woman with a diagnosis of bipolar II, described her return to sociality,
which she attributed partly to the medication, as problematic because
of her desire to have children:
The biggest hurdle for me now is that I'm at the point where I am
happy with my life and job and study…my partner and I would like
to have kids. But that involves coming oﬀ medications and that's
quite nerve-wracking.
While medication may have facilitated her return to ‘life and job
and study’, they are now positioned as obstacles to Joan's progress in
social and intimate life. A degree of optimism through medication cir-
culates in these narratives reﬂecting the relational subjectivities at work
in them, as do notes of fear and ambivalence.
For several participants, drugs, in perturbing emotions, produced a
diﬀerent dimension of pharmaco-aﬀective sociality whereby in-
dividuals' capacity to aﬀect and be aﬀected was disturbed and re-
conﬁgured. A capacity for the expression of feelings was viewed as a
therapeutic activity that some participants could not access. Riya, a 22-
year-old woman whose diagnoses included borderline personality dis-
order, referred to the metaphor of the zombie when conveying her
emotions while on quetiapine: ‘I felt like I'd lost my body … I was just
zombiﬁed all the time’. Such images served to make experiences of
pharmaco-aﬀective subjectivity more intelligible for the interviewer,
and to communicate the profound impact of the medication on parti-
cipant's ability to feel and manifest emotions. After changing her med-
ication Alejandra, for example, touched her heart and expressed relief:
‘I feel a lot more emotional as a person but not to the point where I'm
unwell but I just feel like I'm feeling emotions a bit more’.
Treatment through psychotropic drug therapy is believed to provide
options and hope for a manageable social life, if not ‘recovery’ from
symptoms associated with mental illness. The valuing of one kind of life
over another emerged as a complicated prospect for our participants.
Indeed, while pharmaceutical therapy for mental illness may indicate
that a life of hearing voices, for example, is not desirable, so too may be
a life on psychotropic medication. There is a tension between the
medication working both for and against people, alongside an over-
arching desire to live ‘medication free’. Joan expressed this entangle-
ment of ambivalence and pharmaco-aﬀective sociality as follows: ‘what
works for one patient isn't going to work for the next patient … in an
ideal world there'd be a magic pill that everyone could take the same
things… and live a happy, fulﬁlling life.’ Sociality is a fundamental part
of the dynamism of forces that constitute kinds of subjects in treatment,
in the event of consuming particular medications (Duﬀ, 2014).
5. Conclusion
In qualitative explorations of the experience of being diagnosed
with mental illness, the complexities of mediating medications – as
variously disabling, enabling, normative and liberative – has been an
importance facet of trajectories toward survivorship, wellbeing and
recovery (e.g., Morrison et al., 2015; Carrick et al., 2004). This paper
has sought to add further nuance to this scholarly and empirical ﬁeld,
by considering the modes of subjectivity intra-actively produced
through psychotropic medications. Understanding those modes of
subjectivity, and the particular relations, practices and events in which
they are produced, oﬀer novel grounds for interrogating the character
and meaning of side eﬀects, aﬄiction, wellbeing and recovery. Rather
than insisting upon clear spatial and temporal distinctions between side
eﬀects and therapeutic eﬀects, for instance, this oﬀers an approach to
being ‘relieved’ from symptoms of mental illness as non-linear, and
messier and more complicated than often represented. The symptoms of
mental illness and eﬀects of medications have often strange temporal
trajectories and complex ways of becoming visible/knowable to the
person experiencing them. Our analysis clariﬁed, then, how nuanced
and heterogeneous are the adjudications that people make about the
role that taking – or indeed not taking – psychotropic medications
might have in relation to putative futures that might bring ‘health’. The
intra-active approach has revealed forces of movement, ambivalence
and forms of sociality that disturb the assumptions that underpin much
of the mainstream literature on mental illness treatment. In so doing,
we have sought to unpack some of the aﬀective and material relations
that people develop with (and in relation to) psychotropic drugs. This
opens a critical space where ‘side eﬀects’, ‘therapeutic eﬀects’ and
subjectivity – and the object of the drug – are intimately entangled and
inextricable from each other. In terms of the social science of mental
healthcare, the accounts presented here suggest that experiences of
psychotropic medications are in fact better articulated as intra-sub-
jective emergences, as co-produced and inﬂected by power relations.
Further, that these relations evade temporal simplicity (i.e. thinking
beyond prior drug eﬀects or progressive/typical ‘symptoms’ to relieve)
but rather a vitalistic process of becoming (rather than being) and one
that operates on and through a brain-body-world axis (Blackman,
2012).
The particular importance of this work lies in highlighting the on-
tological problems associated with ‘typical’ ways of knowing and
thinking about medications. For example, the assumptions around
pathologies (things to supress) and necessary side eﬀects (things to
tolerate). The forms of ambivalence expressed point to the ontological
instability of such ideas. Lines between symptomatic and side eﬀects,
functioning and dysfunctional, may be much murkier than often re-
cognised. Hence, the idea of medication as entanglement – with body,
person, authority, institution, power and identity – is more theoretically
useful way into examining drug eﬀects. It allows us to ask, what does
this technology do in and for this person; what does the medication
itself embody, perhaps a certain version of stability? A series of side
eﬀects deemed acceptable in the past by people in positions of authority
to make such decisions? Other actors and subjects produce sub-
jectivities in the present, and even future possibilities for recovery.
Pharmaceuticals and their eﬀects, bodies, minds and moods form
part of the dynamic system through which subjectivity is undone and
remade. This is not to suggest the emergence of a coherent, ‘whole’
subject who overcomes illness and ‘lives with’ side eﬀects as a kind of
necessary harm. Rather, subjects are continually fragmented and re-
articulated. The reality of the complex eﬀects of medication, sensed, felt
and narrated, reveals the contingencies and continual ‘becomings’, ra-
ther than stable entities, of medication and subjectivity. This suggests a
new task in the treatments of experiences attracting psychiatric diag-
noses requiring sensitivity to the ways subjectivities are contested, ex-
pressed and transformed in treatment, to sit alongside more conven-
tional concerns for diagnosis, therapy and recovery. It also suggests that
the experience of treatment and medication is not straightforward, and
that any assertion of linear and predictable drug eﬀects should be
treated with caution. Instead, the ‘intra-actions’ of subjects, bodies,
medications and treatment stand out.
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